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THE JOINER PRIZE ESSAY 
Locke and B«caria: 
Faculty Psychology and Capital Punishment 
Steven Lynn 
University oj South Carolina 
The Ir.alian critic who called Cesare Beccaria's TraUalo del deliitl e 
delle pene (or Essay on Crimes and Punishments) "indisputably the most 
effective literary work of the entire eighteenth century" may perhaps be 
forgiven his enthusiasm, for the international influence of Beccaria's work, 
published in July, 1764, and translated almost immediately into every rna· 
jor language, appears to have been enormous. By 1822 it was possible for 
Beccaria's Paris editor to credit him with "the abolition of torture in most 
European states, the suppression of cruel punishments, and the improve-
ment of penal law. H, Modern assessments have agreed without exception 
that Beccaria "inspired far-reaching reforms in criminal law" and helped 
shape the thinking of a host of eighteenth·century thinkers, ranging from 
Benjamin Franklin to Voltaire! Yet, in reading through the history of 
criminal law and punishment, one notes with dismay that in England it was 
not until 1789 that the last execution by burning was carried out; nOt until 
1834 that branding as a punishment was abolished; not until 1837 that the 
pillory was outlawed; and nOI until 1820 that the number of capital crimes 
begins to decrease, having gone from less than fifty in Tudor and Stuart 
times to more than two hundred.} Ir Beccaria's work is, as Harry Barnes 
says, "the most effective work in the field of the reform of criminal 
jurisprudence" (not as extravagant a claim perhaps as "the most effective 
literary work," but certainly a substantial assertion) , its effectiveness may 
well seem slow and limited nonetheless." To be sure, Beccaria's profound 
reluctance to employ capital punishment was often echoed and invoked in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; and, in England in the period 
1803-1810, for example, of 1,872 thieves convicted and sentenced to death, 
only one was actually executed.' But, as Leon Radzinowicz points out in 
his massive HIstory or English Criminal Law, replacing capital punishment 
with imprisonment was often replacing a quick and relatively painless death 
with a slow, torturous one, given the conditions of imprisonment. Moreover, 
Radzinowicz argues, Beccaria's reforms were severely compromised because 
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his [ocus on capital punishment "neglected the problem of secondary 
punishments, without the solution of which any reform of criminal law was 
destined 10 remain abortive."~ 
Although there is no doubt some truth in Radzinowicz's observation, 
Beccaria does nOI entirely neglect secondary punishments, for he does pro-
vide insistently a governing principle for all punishments: they should "make 
the strongest and most lasting impressions on the minds of others, with 
the least torment to the body of the criminal" (41-Z). Beccaria's qualified 
success or qualified failure (whichever one prefers) is, I would argue, more 
complex than a neglect or focus on this or that particular facet of crime 
and punishment. To understand more fuUy why Beccaria was accorded such 
immediate and continued applause, and why, given this pervasive apprecia-
tion of Beccaria, his practical impact was not more radical and precipitous, 
we need to understand better the intellectual context his work inhabited. 
Most often Beccaria has been considered as a point of origin, a context 
for later developments, and when Beccaria's own contexts have been con-
sidered, the errorl has been primarily TO track down the genealogy of various 
progressive ideas.' I propose here an investigation of what is in some ways 
a more fundamental, yet neglected, relationship: how does the model of 
the mind that Beccaria and his contemporaries inherited influence the genesis 
and reception of his ideas? Eighteenth-century assumptions about the work-
ings of the mind, I will suggest, help to explain both Beccaria's spectacular 
intellectual appeal as weU as the incomplete and glacially slow response to 
his ideas in practice.' 
if we want some idea of how Beccaria and others in the eighteenth 
century might have viewed the mind. Locke's Essay concerning Human 
Understanding, evolved in the 16705 and 80s. published in 1690, would seem 
to be the logical document to examine. Throughout this period, according 
to Kenneth MacLean, Locke's work had the most influence of any book, 
the Bible only excepted; W.S. Howell agrees that Locke's works on 
understanding "were without question the most popular, the most widely 
read, the most frequently reprinted, and the most influential of all English 
books.'" It is not surprising then that Locke's model of the mind pervades 
eighteenth-century thought. To choose only one exampie, Beccaria's friend, 
Helvetius, uses Locke's theory of mind to found his notions of man's equali-
ty. I 0 Thus, to understand Beccaria, we need to consider how Locke con-
structs his psychology, and what its essence is-not in order to demonstrate 
that Beccaria employed Locke specifically, but ralher to consider the im-
plications of the psychology Beccaria and his age would have assumed. 
Locke's principal tools of analysis in constructing his model of the mind 
an: eriil)un: and dt:ronnation. I I Seeing him5e1f as an "Under-Labourer," 
"clearing Ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in 
the way to Knowledge," Locke considers what our understanding would 
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be like if we could not see, if our senses were quicker. if two souls occupied 
the same body, if a cat and a rat mated.' 3 His most famous erasure, the 
subject of Book I, removed innate ideas. thus requiring that the materials 
our minds manipulate must ultimately derive from sensations. Sensations 
must act upon something, and so Locke implies a mental surface that 
receives the impress of sensations; then he considers what it would be like 
to erase lhis surface. to return to that pre-infantile Slate of the famous tabula 
rasa. He also imagines an organ or system for thought, and how this 
biological thinking machine would function if it too were returned to an 
original, blank state. In order to work. the mind would need various 
capacities, or "faculties,' I that this empty mind must have in order to func-
lion. By "faculties," Locke tells us, he does not mean "some real Beings 
in the SOW" or "so many distinct Agents in us" -alarming ideas (237); 
rather, he means only a power or an ability (241). 
In his Qualification of "facwlies," Locke is auempting to avoid the 
kind of explanatory regress that answers the question "What digested the 
groceries?" with the response "The digestive faculty." BUI by saying that 
a faculty is not an agent but rather a power, Locke is nonetheless unable 
to avoid the implication of a partitioned mind, composed of separate 
functions-a model that displaces the problem of "mind" ramer than ex-
plaining it, for the simple reason that some entity, some personhood, would 
seem necessarily to be in charge of the various faculties. Hence, we see the 
necessity and the auractiveness of positing a soul that receives and 
superintends the operations of the faculties. But Locke is not willing to 
situate this soul in a particular place, unlike Descartes and others who favor 
the pineaJ gland as its home; in fact, Locke is not willing to give the soul 
materiality at all, but at the same time he is equally unwilling to assign it 
immateriality:" 'Tis past controversy, that we have in us something that 
thinks; our Very Doubts about what it is confirm the certainty of its being, 
though we must content our selves in the Ignorance of what kind of Being 
it is." ' ) 
This displacement of the mind's agency and the ambiguous status of 
its nature allow Locke's model of the mind to serve his thesis well, for a 
crucial aspect of Locke's project involves exposing the extent to which the 
mind is a passive receptacle for sensations: by exposing the gap between 
these sensations and our ideas, especially our complex ideas (or "notions" 
Locke would prefer) like "murder" and "sacrilege," Locke hopes to pro-
mote tolerance and humility: "The necessity of believing, without 
Knowledge, nay. often upon very slight grounds, in this fleeting state of 
Action and Blindness we are in, should make us more busy and careful 
to inform our selves, than constrain otheN" (660). This drive toward tolera-
tion and generosity is also fostered by Locke's discussion "Of the Imperfec-
tion of Words," the title of chapter 9 in Book III. Because words cannot 
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cross this gap betwun sensations and thoughts, Locke insists that words 
"stand ror nOlhlng bul lhe Ideas in the Mind of him Ihat uses them, how · 
imperfectly soc:ver or carelessly those Ideas are collected from the things 
which they are supposed to represent" (405; emphasis is Locke's). Among 
those words exemplifying the "arbitrary imposition" (478) of meaning, 
Locke includes "Justice. Just; Equality, Equal" (474). 
Beccaria. near the outset of his treatise. similarly undermines his con-
temporaries' confidence in the word "justice," informing them "We should 
be cautious how we associate with the word j ustice, an idea of any thing 
real, such as a physical power, or a being that actually exists" (9). By 
ac],:now!edgini. like Locke. the gap between ru and vrrba, Beccaria reminds 
us that "justice" is an arbitrary construct, which for him means "nOlhing 
more, than that bond which is necessary to keep the interest of individuals 
united" (9). This move dismantles for Beccaria the institutionalized con-
ception of "justice" as a slable standard, grounded in rea1ity-a concep-
tion that involved retribution in the idea of justice, and led 10 such absurd-
ities as trying and executing animals and even insects. It was this need 10 
balance some evil with retribution and purgation in order to realize "justice" 
that led, for example, the French legal system in 1386 to try, sentence, tor-
lure, and execute by hanging a pig that had injured a young boy." Such 
a ritualistic approach to punishment survives well into the eighteenth cen-
tury with the procession to Tyburn, or the practice in aggravated cases of 
returning the criminal to the crime's scene for his punishment. Beccaria 
and other enlightened eightccnth-«ntury thinkers reject an economy of 
justice that requires an injury to be offset by an equal injury . 
.. Justice" is not the only term that Beccaria writes under erasure. All 
complex words, he says in Lockean language, are composed of "simple 
ideas" that are "easily confounded"-which explains why "truths ofmorali· 
ty" are less distinctly known than "the revolutions of the heavenly bodies" 
(32). As examples, Beccaria points to "the uncertainty of our notions of 
honour and virtue," an uncertainty made inevitable by the arbitrary con· 
nection between "names" and "the things they originally signified" (23). 
Beccaria. tacitly following Locke, is so much aware of the prisonhouse of 
language that he would have no one placed in a more substantial prisonhouse 
on the basis of words: "when the question relates to the words of a 
criminal." "the credibility of a witness is null." Actions. res, must found 
an accusation. not verba··which, as Locke tells us. "stand for nothing but 
the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them. II 
Thus, Locke's description of the mind's fundamental faculty establishes 
Ihis position, crucial to his argument as well as Beccaria's: "the first facul· 
ty of the Mind" is "bare naked PertepUon," which is "the inlet of all 
Knowledge."; in the performance ofthis faculty, "the Mind is, for the most 
part, only passive" (149, 143)··Locke will later say the mind, "in respect 
5 
to its simple Ideu, is wholly passive" (288). The ambiguous status-where 
is it? what is it?--of the "something that thinks" tends to accentuate the 
primacy of sensations and the passivity of the mind. This passivity, together 
with the arbitrariness of words (which is built on the apparent happenstance 
of sensation), presents a model of the mind conducive to forgiveness. not 
harsh punishment: We are shaped by our environments, by the sensations 
we r«eive and the actions of our faculties upon these sensations. And 
because of the imperfection of words. and the lack of innate ideas, including 
the absence of an innate moral code, OUf convictions (in both senses) should 
be suspect and tentative. 
Beccaria's humanitarian outlook is thus based on assumptions that ob-
viously accord with Locke's model of perception. Beccaria takes for granted, 
for example, that our ideas are based on our sensations: while the legal 
system in his day presumed the accused to be guilty and forced him to 
prove his innocence, Beccaria argues, based tacitly on Lockean psychology, 
that the presumption should be against the accuser, "for no man is cruel 
(that is, in accusing another of a serious crime) without some motive of 
fear or hate. There are no spontaneous or superfluous sentiments in the 
heart of man; they are the result of impressions on the senses" (45). Similar-
ly, Beccaria's argument against the practice of using torture to extract the 
truth is based on the following premise: "Every act of the will is invariably 
in proportion to the force of the impression on our senses; and the sen-
sibility of every man is limited" (60). If a man's ideas are completely oc-
cupied at the fundamental level by pain, he is not likely to tell the truth; 
he is only likely to teli whatever will end the pain. 
Beccaria's extraordinary reluctance to invoke capital punishment, or 
any extreme punishment, is also related to the perceiver's passivity in Locke's 
model. Because our sentiments are "all the result of impressions on the 
senses" (45), Beccaria is especially reluctant to punish harshly those crimes 
that obviously result from the criminal's environment and experiences. For 
example, punishing sodomy with torture and severe punishment. including 
capital punishment, seems outrageous to him because the crime is the result 
not so much of "the passions of man" as the present system of education, 
in which "ardent youth are carefully excluded from all commerce with the 
other sex, as the vigour of nature blooms" (125). Indeed, in all crimes 
Beccaria tends to see the perpetrator as another victim, driven to do wrong 
by what he has experienced. Robbery "alas! is commonly the effect of 
misery and despair" (80), he says for example. Beccaria in fact goes so far 
as to argue that the punishment of any crime cannot be just if the state 
has not endeavored by the best available means to prevent it (118). 
Beccaria shares with a number of eighteenth-century reformers this will-
ingness to imagine sympathetically the thought processes of the criminal 
(and potential criminal). Samuel Johnson. to QUote only OOe illustrious eX-
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ample quoting another illustrious example. in Rlmbler 114 confirms 
Boerhaave's remark "that he never saw a criminal dragged to execution 
without asking himself, 'Who knows whether this man is not less culpable 
than me?' " I I Such empathy. which becomes more and mOTC common as 
the age of reason becomes the age of sensibility, ccrlainly owes something 
to Locke's influence; and the idea that our minds work in the same ways, 
and this working is not entirely under our contrOl, certainly tends to fosler 
Boerhaave's sort of consideration. As Johnson writes in Sermon 26. perhaps 
revealing more of his own conscience: than he intended, "scarce anyone 
can see" a convicted thief "in the hands of the executioner, without re-
flecting that the crimes, for which they dye are less than his own."" 
If Locke's description of the first faculty tends to suggest to his readers 
how anyone, shaped by his perceptions. might go astray, it is his discus-
sion of the second faculty, retention, that actually gives a much deeper in-
sight into the workings of deviance, and even madness. The implications 
of this second faculty also appear to strengthen our sympathy for the 
criminal/ victim; but at the same time, pursued to their logical end, its im-
plications finally underscore the necessity of punishment-even severe 
punishment, even (perhaps) capital punishment, despite our psychologically 
grounded sympathy. 
The second faculty in Locke's model of the mind, "retention," or 
memory, allows us to store sensations in order to compare, relate, com-
bine, discriminate. abstract, etc. This storage has its own problems, as "there 
seems to be a constant decay of all our Ideas, even of those which are struck 
deepest, and in Minds the most retentive" (151). Thus, if our ideas are not 
"sometimes renewed by repeated Exercise of the Senses, or Reflection on 
those kind of Objects, which at first occasioned them, the Print wears out, 
and al last there remains nothing to be seen" (lSI). Beccaria obviously 
employs a similar model of Lhinking when he notes that "ideas of morality 
are stamped on our minds by repeated impressions" (106). Unlawful acts 
become potentially failures of morality that are arguably the fault of the 
society, which fails to write its moral code on its citizens clearly enough 
or which allows its code to be naturally erased by negJect. Lacking an in-
nate moral code, requiring "repeated exercise of the senses" in order to 
sustain an idea. human beings confront a fragile and even arbitrary system 
of right and wrong, as Beccaria stresses: 
Whoever reads with a philosophic eye, the history of na-
tions, and their laws, will generally find, that the ideas of 
virtue and vice. of a good or a bad citizen, change with 
the ages; not in proportion to the alteration of cir-
cumstances, and consequently conformable to the common 
good; but in proportion to the passiOns and errors by which 
the different law-givers were successively influenced. (23) 
7 
This remark, which must be unsculing to anyone who would enforce the 
current laws with any ferocity, is followed by an even more disarming one, 
asserting that in fact "the passions and vices of one age, are the founda-
tion of the morality of the following." This moral topsy-turviness results, 
Beccaria makes clear, from the way our sensations. impressions. passions. 
are "weakened by time." 
If the imperfection of words and the fragility of ideas do tend toward 
empathy and leniency toward criminals. there is another aspect of this sec-
ond faculty of retention that would appear to compel society to punish those 
who do wrong, despite its sympathy for them. This aspect is the associa-
tion of whatever ideas we are able to retain and manipulate. Because we 
cannot work with a multitude of primary or "simple" ideas, as Locke ex-
plains, relationships between and among ideas are inevitably and necessarily 
formed as a function of thinking. Some of these associations, he says, are 
"natural" or real and therefore valuable. But, "there is another Connex-
ion of Ideas wbolly owing to Chance or Custom; Ideas that in themselves 
are not at all of kin, come to be so united in Mens Minds, that 'tis very 
hard to separate them" (39S). lltis accidental association is not only a prob-
lem; it is, Locke thinks, "the foundation of the greatest" for not "all the 
Errors in the World" (401)-an astonishingly broad indictment. For Locke, 
however, such accidental associations, which occur with distressing frequen-
cy, engender an unreality, a kind of madness even, and he points to the 
unfounded yet irreconcilable and often violent oppositions between "dif-
ferent Sects of Philosophy and Religion" and "Party" as a prime example 
of the power (and danger) of association. With the second faculty, the mind, 
so passive in the workings of the first faculty, becomes disturbingly alive. 
The plasticity of associations provides a logical basis for punishment, 
even harsh punishment, as a deterrent. In fact. Beccaria sees such deter-
rence as essential to the life of society, which 
is prevented from approaching to that dissolution (10 
which. as well as all other parts of the physical and moral 
world, it naturally tends) only by motives that are the im-
mediate objects of sense, and which being continually 
presented to the mind, are sufficient to counterbalance the 
effect of the passions of the individual, which oppose the 
general good. Neither the power of eloquence nor the 
sublimest truths, are sufficient to restrain, for any length 
of time, those passions which are excited by the lively im-
pressions of present objects. (6) 
Such pessimism, which immediately strikes one as Hobbesian, can also be 
traced to Locke, who thinks it would be "ullerly in vain" to propose a 
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law without rewards and punishments (351). Servan, who refers en-
thusiastically to Beccaria's essay only three years after ils publication, reveals 
how deterrence comes to be s«n in terms of Lockean psychology. writing 
that "the immutable base of the strongest empires rests upon the soft fibres 
of the brain," and "to establish an association of ideas" to deter criminal 
acts, "there must be a regular association of events: in brid, the citizenry 
must see crimes punished always as soon as they are commUted.'tI, 
Although Beccaria is more cautious Ihan his adherent, raising the issue of 
justice miscarrying In the' 'promptitude of punishment." he considers the 
temporal connection of crime to punishment so important, being "one of 
the most powerful means of preveming crimes" (115), that the dangers of 
miscarriage are oUlweighed, and therefore crimes should be punished as 
soon as possible-if not "as soon as they are commited," Here is Beccaria, 
employing obviously Lod.:t'an lanauaae. even referring indirectly to Locke's 
Essay it appears, to explain the role of association in deterrence: 
An immediate punishment is more useful; because the 
smaller the interval of time between the punishment and 
the crime. the stronger and more lasting will be the associa-
tion of the twO ideas of Crime and Punishment; so that 
t hey may be considered , one as the cause, the other as the 
unavoidable and necessaryeffed, It is demonstrated, that 
the association of ideas is the cement which unites the 
fabric of the human intellecl; without which. pleasure and 
pain would be simple and ineffa;tual scnsntions, (7)-4) 
When time elapses between Ihe crime and punishment, Beccaria notes, the 
spectators see the punishment as "a terrible sight" rather than "the necessary 
consequence of a crime" (75), and deterrence is weakened. 
Thus, the role of association in deterrence not only supports a rush 
to sentencing and punishment, it also makes severe, horrible punishment 
seem reasonable, for the more dramatic the associated deterrent, the more 
powerfully persons may be dissuaded from crime. If punishments were suf-
ficiently horrible, one may reason, then no one in his or her right mind 
would break Ihe law. Such logic led William Paley, who assumed with 
Beccaria and others that "The proper end of human punishment is not the 
satisfaction of justict: but the prevention of crimes," to speculale soberly 
in 1785 on the possibility of beneficially augmenting "the horror of punish-
ment" by "caslina murderers into a den of wild beasts, where they would 
perish in a manner dreadful to the imagination, yet concealed from the 
view.'" • The check on such a not uncommon train of thought is expressed 
by Beccaria, once more working in terms of Lockean psychology: "In pro-
portion as punishments become more cruel, the minds of men, as a fluid 
rises to the same height Il$thal which surrounds it. grow hardened and in-
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sensible" (96). Such a hydraulic comparison, especially effective given the 
nuid mechanics of the nervous system as Locke and the medicine of his 
day understood it, might not apply to punishments not witnessed by the 
public, but only related to them. Hence Paley's stipulation, "concealed from 
the view," 
This sort of thinking, supported powerfully by Locke's ueauneo! of 
association, is arguably behind the widespread endorsement in Beccaria's 
day and even our own of capital punishment. And it is not enough, as 
Fielding argues in his Enquiry into tbe Ca uses of the Lale Increase of Rub· 
bers (1751), to legislate capital punishment, and even to sentence persons 
to die; if the wrongdoers are frequently pardoned, as they were throughout 
the century (but less so after his Enquiry), then the deterrenl effect is weak-
ened because the association is imparied. " Logically then, if capital punish-
menl deters strongly, then why not employ that prevenlion against more 
and more crimes? This multiplication of capital crimes is, of course, what 
happened over the course of the sevenleenth and eighteenth centuries. 
But Beccaria brings other tines of argumenl to bear against making 
punishments more horrible and severe. To understand these arguments bet-
ter, we might compare his reasoning to that of William Blackstone, whose 
famous Commentaries came out almost simultaneously with Beccaria's 
Essay. Blackstone was able to justify capital punishment by reference to 
the Bible and "the social contract,"'· but he was nonetheless un-
comfortable with applying capital punishment to crimes only milia prohibltll 
rather than milia in St. Blackstone could imagine capital punishment being 
invoked to StOp loaded wagons from damaging roads, since current penalties 
had been unable to curtail the practice.l' Such a law would lack propor-
tion, Blackstone felt. 
Beccaria assumes with Blackstone and virtually every other eighteenth-
century theorist that there shou ld be a proportion between the crime and 
the punishment, and that the current system failed in that respect. Beccaria 
argues effectively that the proportional c1assirication of crimes and 
punishments should be based on " the injury done to society" (27), not the 
crime's degree of evil, for only "the Almighty ... who cannot receive im-
pressions of pleasure, or pain, and who alone, of all other beings, acts 
without being acted upon" (27) can discern gradations of evil--can, in other 
words, escape the subjectivity and arbitrariness that, as Locke makes clear, 
pervade all our judgments. Thus, physical punishment, including execu-
tion, would be possibly appropriate only when the crime Involved physical 
injury or murder--certainly not in cases of forgery or theft. 
Even for the most severe injuries to another person, however, Beccaria 
opposes capital punishment, and the grounds of his opposition are not solely 
the result of sympathy (based on the implications of Lodean perception) 
outweighing deterrence (based on the implications of Lockean association). 
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Beccaria's acceptance of association and deterrence is clear enough: but 
he finds capital punishment inappropriate for many crimes by refining the 
idea of proportion. He thinks that making "the punishment as anaJogous 
as possible to the nature of the crime" would aClUslly strengthen "this im-
portant conneltion between the ideas of crime and punishment" (7.5). In 
other words, if a man commits robbery, then he should himself be 
"robbed," with his own goods confiscated and also (since this crime is so 
often "the effect of misery and despair" -read "poverty") the fruits of his 
forced tahor taken (80). 
But the force of aoaJegy will not dispense with aU capital punishments, 
and Beccaria sets forth a principle that tends to soften all punishments of 
whatever severity, While punishment should "make the strongest and most 
lasting impressions on the minds of others," it should do so "with lhe least 
torment 10 the body of the criminal" (41-2). The logic for the important 
laller part of this formula is not based simply on the thesis that extreme 
punishments may harden the public to violence. Ralher, in a seminal state-
ment, Beccaria holds that "The certainty of a small punishment will make 
a stronger impression, than the fear of one more severe, if [the more severe 
one is) attended with the hopes of escaping" (95). If punishments are per-
ceived 10 be too severe for small crimes, nOt only is the system reluctant 
to carry out the sentence, but offenders will proceed to commit a larger 
crime to avoid detection (95). Beccaria also makes the related argument 
that execution is "a terrible but momentary spectacle, and therefore a less 
efficacious melhod of deterring others, than the continued example of a 
man deprived of his liberty, condemned, as a beast of burden, to repair, 
by his labour, the injury he has done 10 society" (134). Only when a citizen 
by simply remaining alive threatens "the security of the nation" (as in 
revolutionary times) can the stale illegally but justifiably take from him 
what he has no power to give, his life--and even tben it is a sign of the govern-
ment's weakness, Beccaria says. 
Beccaria's consideration of Crimes lind Punl$hmenu employs, as we 
might expect and as we have seen, a Lockean model of the mind. Some 
pan of the power of Beccaria's amalgamation and extension of previous 
humanitarian sentiments must be due to the grounding of his argument in 
a coherent and widely accepted model of the mind. But, as J have argued, 
while Locke's discussion of "perception" (and the relationship of language 
to sensations) tends to support Beccaria's progressive, humane stance on 
the one hand, the implications of retention (and association) tend 10 call 
it into question on the other. As Locke writes in his discussion of "Power," 
"wbtn we compare prese.nt Pleasure or Pain with future (which is usually 
the case in the most important determinations of the Will) we orteo make 
wrong Judgments of (hem" because "Objects, ncar our view, arc apt to 
be thought greater, than those of a larger size, that arc more remote" (275). 
II 
Such psychological facts suggest that only severe punishments will func-
tion as an effective deterrenl. Although Beccaria's argument against severe 
punishments, especially capital punishment, is appealing, and Beccaria even-
tually came 10 be seen as the most important force in the abolition of tOT-
lure. the more humane treatment of criminals, and the eventual elimina-
tion of capital punishment for many laws, the psychological case on Lockean 
grounds (or a powerful deterrent arguably fette red the movement toward 
reform, authorizing both the celebration (in spirit) and the disregard (in 
particulars) of Betcaria and his followers. 
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